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Justice Policy Institute (JPI) (Washington DC)

This brief presents information regarding pretrial and bail reform during 2013. Sections of this publication address: legislative activity; bail bond industry balks at attempts to collect forfeitures; some jurisdictions utilize pretrial services to ease jail crowding; corrupt bondsmen; and recommendations. "Overall, most jurisdictions continue to rely on money instead of scientifically measured public safety risk when it comes to pretrial release decisions. That practice, shown time and again to be ineffective, unfair and expensive, threatens public safety and puts money in the pockets of the for-profit bail bonding industry" (p. 1).

Bail Reform Update, 2013 Cover

This report is for anyone interested in the challenges associated with incarcerated youth. The Justice Policy Institute “discovered that adjusting funding schemes was just one of many successful strategies for juvenile confinement reform and, in fact, there are many states that have significantly reduced their juvenile confined populations without fiscal reform. States have initiated top-down policy changes, requiring police and courts to treat juveniles differently, resulting in fewer youth confined. Others have simply closed their state’s juvenile correctional facilities, forcing judges to adopt less restrictive responses to juvenile delinquency. What follows is a critical analysis of those elements that appeared to contribute to the greatest reductions in rates of confinement over the past decade” (p. 3). Sections of this report include: introduction; measuring reform—focus on juvenile confinement; the national perspective in confinement, 2001 to 2010; common elements among states that were the “top performers”; brief data analysis of these five states—Connecticut, Tennessee, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Arizona; and recommendations.

› Common Ground: Lessons Learned from Five States that Reduced Juvenile Confinement by More than Half Cover

This report "analyzes how behaviors are categorized under sometimes-arbitrary offense categories, explores the larger context that exists when something is classified as a violent or nonviolent offense, and shows the consequences for the justice system and the use of incarceration. This report also looks at how the debate over justice approaches to violent crime, nonviolent crime, and incarceration is playing out in legislatures and how justice reform proposals are debated " (p. 4). Access is provided to the full report, Summary, Data Summary, State Summary and Crime Victims and Justice Reform Fact Sheet.

Defining Violence Cover

“Perhaps more than any other state, Connecticut has absorbed the growing body of knowledge about youth development, adolescent brain research and delinquency, adopted its lessons, and used the information to fundamentally re-invent its approach to juvenile justice. As a result, Connecticut’s system today is far and away more successful, more humane, and more cost-effective than it was 10 or 20 years ago. This report will describe, dissect, and draw lessons from Connecticut’s striking success in juvenile justice reform for other states and communities seeking similar progress” (p. 1). Sections of this report include: introduction—seizing the opportunity; seven major accomplishments made in Connecticut’s juvenile justice reform; timeline of change—transformation over two decades—a deeply flawed system (1992), growing attention but few solutions (2002), and a transformed system (2012); Connecticut’s array of evidence-based family interventions; keys to success—state of change, Connecticut’s chemistry for reform; and lessons learned—strategies that could help boost success in other jurisdictions.

Juvenile Justice Reform Cover

"Thirty-three U.S. states and jurisdictions spend $100,000 or more annually to incarcerate a young person, and continue to generate outcomes that result in even greater costs … [this report] provides estimates of the overall costs resulting from the negative outcomes associated with incarceration. The report finds that these long-term consequences of incarcerating young people could cost taxpayers $8 billion to $21 billion each year." This report is divided into eight parts: the costs we bear for overreliance on youth confinement—progress in reducing confinement, without compromising public safety; the tip of the iceberg—what taxpayers pay too incarcerate youth—cost in context and whether the price is too high; estimating the total long-term costs of youth confinement; reoffending and recidivism—studies used to estimate the impact of youth confinement on recidivism, and estimating the costs of youth confinement on recidivism; education, employment, and wages—studies used to estimate the impact of youth confinement on educational attainment; victimization of youth—estimating the impact of youth confinement on facility-based sexual assault, and estimating the cost of impact of sexual assaults on confined youth; the final tally and what we potentially save when we make better choices—a modest silver lining—what the youth deincarceration trend means for the collateral costs; and recommendations.

› Sticker Shock: Calculating the Full Price Tag for Youth Incarceration Cover
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